In this chapter on knowledge, truth, epistemology and logic, N. Rescher remarks that, in opposition to the process oriented view of things, Western thought has been dominated by a static and substantialist view of truth and knowledge. Philosophical or scientific inquiry should provide us with true facts about the world, the world as it is, and not the world as it is said to be. And the world as it is is a world of processes. Whitehead already noted that the tacit assumption of a necessary static spatio-temporal and physical form of order had hampered Western philosophy although the evolution of science had not shown that there was such a necessity. In contrast, process has to be understood through the interweaving of data, form, transition, and issue into new data which characterize each unit of fact. If process is fundamental to actuality, each ultimate individual fact must be describable as process. We follow and illustrate several of N. Rescher's suggestions and remarks about language, logic and mathematics before focusing on the question of time and motion, following the lead of natural philosophy, from Newton to Whitehead and Milne.
In this chapter on knowledge, truth, epistemology and logic, Rescher remarks that, in opposition to the process oriented view of things, Western thought has been dominated by a static and substantialist view of truth and knowledge. Philosophical or scientific inquiry should provide us with true facts about the world, the world as it is, which is a world of processes, and not the world as it is said to be 1 .
Whitehead
2 already noted that the tacit assumption of a necessary static spatio-temporal and physical form of order had hampered Western philosophy although the evolution of science had not shown that there was such a necessity. He also recognized that, in contrast, process had to be understood through the interweaving of data, form, transition, and issue into new data which characterize each unit of fact. Moreover, if process is fundamental to actuality, each ultimate individual fact must be describable as process.
Following Rescher, the "crux of process epistemology lies in its […] insistence on seeing the enterprise of rational inquiry-be it in natural science or elsewhere-as being a process" (PM 140), whereas, traditionally, the theory of knowledge has tried to attain a fixed and definite truth of things. Accordingly, we must admit our inability to obtain definitive truth in scientific matters because science is a process, the process of scientific inquiry, rather than a product.
Rather than a detailed analysis of all of Rescher's arguments in this chapter, we will rely on various of his remarks about language, logic and mathematics to suggest ways of illustrating, understanding and supporting his position.
Several of Rescher's allusions to the limitations of natural language in dealing with processes and an ever-changing reality will first lead us to consider some recent work in linguistics that uses a notion of process in the analysis of natural language. Then, from a semantic theory based on a notion of event inspired by Whitehead's and Russell's discussions of the notions of time point, event and interval, we will briefly consider the mathematical language through a branch of topology whose basic ideas derive from the same intuitions and through some idea of process in mathematics.
From Rescher's argument relying on Zeno's Arrow paradox to favour a logic with truth-value gaps, we will consider the question, central for process thought, of the relationship between time, motion and change that Zeno's paradox raises. Time, points and motion will then be met in Newton's Calculus, that marvellous tool to put nature to the question, as the mathematician J. J. Sylvester wrote, but also the place where some notion of time disappears from mathematics and physics. Finally, we will concentrate on a contribution to natural philosophy and epistemology of physics of the first half of last century that is based on the communication of information in a communal setting and which illustrates rather closely Rescher's views on process and communication.
Processes in Natural Language Semantics
The "bias toward static fixity and inert definiteness" (PM 124) that Rescher sees in the tradition of theorizing about logic and language has been recognized in recent studies in the semantics of natural language. It would be wrong to think that our natural languages are poorly equipped to do justice to a process view of the world. Indeed, many of them developed rather rich categorizations and structures that allow their users to describe or to refer easily to changing situations in a changing world.
In the semantic analysis of natural language, the temporal ontology implicit in our language uses has often been explained in terms of Vendler's verbs typology (a typology that can be traced back to Antiquity) and aspectual classes, and analyzed in terms of Reichenbach's semantics of tenses. While tenses give the chronological ordering of events with respect to some utterance situation, aspects characterize the type of events. These can be, either progressive (i.e. an event going on), or perfect, (i.e. an event completed).
In his typology, Vendler 3 distinguishes four types of aspectual classes introduced by verbs: states, activities, accomplishments and achievements. The last three belong to the category of events, i.e. things that occur and induce a change of state. An activity is an event that takes time, which lasts between a start and an end. An achievement is an event that takes no time. It is instantaneous, punctual, has no starting point, no duration. An accomplishment is an activity that ends in an achievement. Vendler obtained these categories from an analysis in terms of the presence or absence of some processual or definite character of the situation referred to by the sentence. One characteristics of process verbs is that they can take the progressive form, expressing that something is going on.
H. Verkuyl 4 has proposed a typology that makes explicit use of a type 'process' in which processes share some properties of states and events. He criticizes Vendler's typology, noting, though, that he could not benefit from all the later developments of linguistics. Indeed, if one wants to analyse language with respect to its way of expressing aspectuality, one has to take into account various parameters like whole or partial truth, (in)completeness, (in)determinacy, and various levels of analysis like those of verb phrases (the verb and its complements), noun phrases and sentences. These are the carriers of aspectual information. They provide a finer analysis that takes into account the information expressed by the various constituents of a sentence. Depending on the values of the features 5 that characterize these carriers, three aspectual classes that combine verbal and nominal information are determined: states, processes, and events 6 . In this linguistic context, the aspectual class of process reflects some dynamic aspect in the situation described by a sentence, that something is going on. In general, no further precision on the exact meaning of process seems required by the linguists who take it as a basic ontological category.
Event Semantics
When studying language at the level of discourse, the semantics usually relies on Reichenbach's analysis 7 of temporal relations based on various orderings of speech time, reference time and event time. A. Prior, who wanted to build a tense logic that accounts for valid reasoning based on tensed statements, objected to Reichenbach's simple approach and added multiple reference points. It is interesting to note that Prior 8 also wanted to refute the arguments of McTaggart who had proposed an a priori proof that not only time, but also space and matter are not real.
The traditional formal analysis of the semantics of natural language based on a truth-conditional model-theoretic semantics defines truth and satisfaction directly on natural language sentences or on their first or higher-order translation. This presupposes a direct correspondence between the sentences and some model of the world. 5 One feature determines the presence or absence of a specified quantity introduced by the noun phrases and another distinguishes stative from nonstative dynamic verbs in verb phrases. 6 Several other authors have also used this partition into three classes.
7 Reichenbach, 1947. 8 A. Prior, Past, Present and Future, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967. Nevertheless, it has been recognized that this traditional approach is not sufficient to explain the dynamic aspect of meaning in its full sense. There are many reasons. One reason is that this approach concentrates only on the sentential level of language use and that it does not capture the contextual role that sentences play in a discourse. Another reason is that classical first-order logic, which is monotonic, cannot represent evolving and changing knowledge or information adequately. In addition, with respect to this dynamic aspect and the necessity to rely on tensed sentences to analyse it, an approach like that of Prior that relies on time points as reference points and evaluation points (truth-value at a point), is easier to manage from a logical point of view than an approach based on intervals. The later are vague; they do not allow a clear treatment of truth-values and, in any case, require starting and ending points.
Recognizing these shortcomings, H. Kamp 9 has proposed a discourse representation theory, a semantics based on events, which insists particularly on the role of time in temporal relations and temporal anaphora. His semantics integrates the dynamic aspects of meaning construction in the traditional model-theoretic approach, no longer at the sentence level, but in a complete piece of discourse. This semantics that relies on an ontology of points, events and intervals and that contains most of the typological distinctions referred to above is also a theory of linguistic knowledge representation and of linguistic communication.
In Kamp's theory, it is possible to talk of durationless events and instants. They are constructs of some sort, built out of elements that have themselves some duration. In addition to events, there are states. In the theory of discourse representation, events involve some change: the occurrence of an event implies that some condition obtains until the end of the event. On the other side, states do not involve change: they are the continuation of the same condition. Events and states are considered as basic, and event and state sentences express essentially the same semantic structure. Events are not reduced to times or inversely though. Events are ontologically irreducible primitive entities. The ontology of this semantics accommodates also time points and intervals. Instants are the "times" that are "atomic"; intervals are the "non-atomic" times. Events can be defined either in terms of times; either the reverse or they are irreducible. This indefiniteness is dealt with following the Russell-Wiener's solution to the problem of making temporally extended entities out of durationless elements and reciprocally. N. Wiener 10 showed indeed how to build a linearly ordered temporal structure of durationless atomic elements (i.e., instants) of a linear order out of elements that have themselves some duration in an underlying structure. From some set of temporal intervals of that linear order, all related by overlap and precedence relations, an instant can be defined as a subset of maximal pairwize overlapping elements of this set. Roughly speaking, an instant is determined by minimising the intervals obtained by maximising the intersections of intervals that share a common temporal part.
This theory provides an analysis of processes not only at the sentential level but also at the discourse level. One same structure serves as context for the sentence to interpret next and as content of the sentence already interpreted. This interpretation is performed by successive introduction of reference markers, also called discourse referents that serve as antecedents of anaphoric expressions in subsequent discourse. In this way, a processual and dynamic perspective is introduced in the semantics of natural language.
This semantic account of the dynamic aspects of discourse illustrates again the importance of the notion of process and proposes ways to deal with the problematic notions of time points and intervals.
Process in Mathematics
The Wiener-Russell's solution is related to the problem of doing geometry without a notion of point, an idea of Whitehead that is at the origin of point-free topology, a mathematical theory that could appear relevant in the context of process thought. Not only temporal points, but also spatial points are problematic. For example, let us try to think about Zeno's paradoxes without using the notion of point in space.
We may see space or, at least, our sensations provide us with some form of perceptible extension that we commonly call space; but we do not see nor perceive dimensionless points. If we want to study space as it is given by our perceptions, how are we going to describe these perceptions mathematically with a notion of dimensionless point? Pointless or pointfree topology 11 is thought to be closer to the natural intuition of space in 10 Wiener, 1914. 11 A topology on a set X is a collection of subsets of X, including the empty set and X, which is closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions. A set X on which such a topology is specified is a topological space. The collection of subsets of X physics than the usual set theoretical conception. Topology is that branch of mathematics that studies the notions of continuity and of neighbourhood. Traditionally, one starts with some set of points and some relation between them. In the new perspective as first worked out by Stone who had the idea of describing space in terms of observable quantities rather than in terms of ideal points, one starts with a notion of concrete observable from which the notion of point is defined as a collection of observables. Considering Wiener's solution at a time when mathematics was no longer the main of his interests, Russell remarked that these ideas could also be important for physics. Nevertheless, in order to construct the mathematical notion of instant from that of event, some hypotheses like the well-ordering of events, i.e. the axiom of choice, are required, "the kind of assumptions one would naturally make does not prove that instants can be constructed
12
." In a letter to K. Menger, another pioneer of point-free topology, Husserl refers to the "necessary turn" in mathematics "toward an ultimate fondamentation which goes back to the primordial sources of its concepts in intuition-in other words, toward a phenomenological foundation 13 ." Point-free topology whose original intuition comes from the relations between perceived space and its mathematical description opens new perspectives for the investigation of the notions of space, continuum and even Calculus and processes.
What could be a process in mathematics? For Whitehead 14 , in any existence there is a creative activity in data, process and issue into datum for further process. The essence of existence lies in the transition from datum to issue. Data condition the form of processes; and existence cannot be abstracted from process; they presuppose each other. In order to understand existence, potentiality is essential because potentiality in immediate fact constitute the driving force of process. According to Whitehead, the error of mathematics was to introduce a doctrine of form devoid of life and motion. Mathematics is indeed concerned with certain that belong to the topology are the open sets. Note that the notion of observable mentioned in the text can now have a rather abstract and technical character. 12 First, in Our Knowledge of the External World and, later, in "On order in Time", 1936 , reprinted in Russell, 1956 . Note of the editor p. 345. 13 Husserl quoted in K. Menger, Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, p. 215. 14 Whitehead, 1938, pp. 96, 92-93. forms of process issuing into forms that are components of further process. The mathematical modes of fusion (in the arithmetical operations of addition, multiplication, series…) are forms of process in which the agents dictate the form of composition that produce the issue. "All mathematical notions have reference to process of intermingling." Numbers illustrate how Whitehead analyses a form of transition in arithmetic and the following example shows how arithmetical statements refer to special forms of process, issuing in a group characterized by some definite arithmetical character. We say that "2x3 is 6" is a tautology. It is a process whose issue is an entity with character "6." With respect to the abstraction "2x3 is 6," "2x3" indicates a form of fluent process and "6" indicates a characterization of the completed fact.
This view of process in mathematics was not uncommon at the end of the 19th century. For example, J. B. Shaw
15
, obviously influenced by Whitehead 16 , claims that in the foundations of mathematics, we find, first, the elements used to build mathematical structures, and, second, the processes by which they are built. "The life of mathematics is the derivation of one thing from others, the transition from data to things that follow according to given processes of transitions."
These ideas are directly inspired by the Ausdehnungslehre of H. Grassmann 17 , "the theory of extensive forms," that strongly influenced Whitehead in Book I of his Treatise on Universal Algebra and in his later philosophy. Grassmann himself had been influenced by Leibniz' Analysis situs, published in 1833, a 'geometry of situation', in the ancestor of topology.
Indeterminacy and Logic
If the natural and mathematical languages allow us to talk about processes, is there any specific logic required to control our reasoning about processes?
According to Rescher, Aristotle's thesis of the truth-value indetermination of future contingencies and the indeterminacy that applies 15 Shaw, 1907, p. 75 . 16 Whitehead, A. N., A Treatise on Universal Algebra, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1898.
to anything which is coming into being or passing away into non-existence shows the advantage of a process oriented approach in metaphysics. Zeno's paradoxes are examples where this indetermination applies. In addition, Rescher claims that these situations and paradoxes have imposed Aristotle to make exception to his original substantialist position.
Although talking of states while process is continuous rather than discrete could be misleading, viewing process as the passage from one state to the next raises the same kind of problems as those raised by Zeno's paradoxes which are about time and motion. Under some explanation of these paradoxes, they mean that either we could well be involved in a regressio ad infinitum, or we could have to be able to perform infinitely many steps instantaneously in order to reach the next state.
Zeno's Arrow paradox intends to show that if time is discrete, made up of indivisible moments or instants, motion is not possible. The problem is the nature of motion. If no change can take place at a temporal instant, then there is no motion at any given instant. Motion cannot be the addition of instantaneous states of rest.
We could first think that Rescher mentions the Arrow paradox because it easily directs us to a preference for a logic that allows truthvalues gaps. Nevertheless, Zeno's paradoxes are paradigmatic of a sort of problem that has been with us ever since he devised them.
One answer to the paradoxes could be that, as such, they are no real problem. The problem is rather the logical confusion they create. Everybody understands the physicist who refers to the 'instantaneous velocity' of a moving body or to the orbiting satellite in 'continuous free fall' because everybody can understand the elementary laws of classical physics. We know that a moving body only moves over a certain laps of time in some interval of space and that it cannot move at an instant over no interval because there is no such thing as time points and dimensionless intervals in the real world. Nevertheless, when we start wondering about natural phenomena, mixing ordinary observational language with theoretical constructions, the problems show up. Epistemology, logic and ontology then enter the scene because we raise mathematical, geometrical or logical abstract questions. For example, what happens when the body stops moving, changing its state of motion for a state of rest. We know that the transition is not instantaneous. However, where is the crossing point from moving to non-moving? Is there anything happening at a durationless point? Zeno tells us that although the arrow moves at each point along its trajectory, at each point it has no time to move and hence, it doesn't move at all times. Acknowledging that there is motion would lead to contradiction and, as a way out, to the rejection of the consistency thesis that underlies classical logic. Rescher prefers to admit truth-values gaps, a position he always defended although, at times and places, one could have expected some stronger position. For example, discussing Bochvar's threevalued logic, he sees the third value "not as much intermediate between truth and falsity but as paradoxical or even meaningless," this meaninglessness being "what is at issue in the classical semantical paradoxes" (TPL67). The existence of contradictions could lead to the adoption of a paraconsistent logic in which, for example, the principle of non-contradiction or the law of substitution of equivalents do not always hold but which can deal with contradictory statements over situations or objects without collapsing 18 . The admission of contradictions could also open the door to some fuzzy logic with degrees of truth and hence, probably, problematic degrees of reality. Nevertheless, the existence of contradictions that are even found in Newtons's Calculus, is a question that should be elucidated.
In another of Zeno's paradoxes, Achilles' paradox, if time is continuous, that is, infinitely divisible, motion is also impossible. Here, the problem is that of determining a distance with respect to time, and to move through infinitely many points. At first, our representation of the problem leads us to suppose that Achilles, when he is infinitely close to the Tortoise, performs infinitely many actions, which, at the limit, are simultaneous.
For Whitehead 19 and others, following G. Cantor's work, Zeno made an error because he had no mathematical notion of infinite series. The problem simply collapses into that of two converging infinite series of time intervals, which have a finite sum, and there is no paradox. This is a classical but not entirely satisfactory answer to the logical problems that these paradoxes raise 20 . In the same perspective, the semantic paradoxes like the Liar can also be mentioned. These paradoxes are of a different kind. They have to do with truth, truth-values and references of various sorts of statements. Tarski's theory of truth has offered some solution to these semantic paradoxes. There, a truth predicate for a language is defined and a distinction is made between language and metalanguage in a hierarchy of 18 Rescher and Brandom, 1980. 19 Whitehead, 1929. 20 See Code, 1985 , chapter 3 for an extended discussion of Zeno's paradoxes.
languages. In his theory of truth, which improves on that of Tarski, S. Kripke 21 uses a value "undetermined" in a three-valued logic that allows truth-value gaps. Of course, this is not the last word on the solution of these paradoxes, assuming they can ever be solved completely 22 . Nevertheless, truth-value indeterminacy simply seen as a "useful mediating device" may not be entirely satisfying though.
A distinction must also be made between a system of pure logic that investigates formal structures and a system of applied logic that investigates various forms of reasoning and inferences, not a priori, but as they are used in various fields of the concrete reasoning experience and based on abstract structures appropriate for specific kinds of inferential mechanisms. An example, Intuitionistic Logic, a logic which, it is interesting to note, emphasizes the aprioricity of time 23 , rejects the principles of excluded middle, double negation and reductio ad absurdum because they are not appropriate in an account of the constructive way of thinking. Similarly, several of the usual principles of classical logic may not be appropriate either to process reasoning or to reason correctly about processes. In the context of a process epistemology that makes room for subjectivity and even intersubjectivity as we will see below, another option could be Discursive Logic. This logic considers discourse as produced by various participants, each producing his piece of information, itself consistent, but which could be contradictory with the information produced by other participants.
Time and Motion
Rescher's reference to Aristotle and Zeno's paradoxes takes us back to the beginnings of Western philosophy. Following him on this road, we consider briefly how the problems related to the notions of space, motion, change, time and time point that are related in an essential way to processes originated and how they finally found a solution in Newton's Calculus, but at a price. 21 Kripke, 1975. 22 Many other solutions or approximations of a solution have been proposed, based on partial worlds, speech acts theory, truth theory based on non-well-founded set theory etc. See, for example, J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy, 1987 and R. Martin, 1984. 23 Brouwer, 1913. From the Ancients to Galileo and Newton, the question about nature has passed from "does anything change?" to "how and how much do things change?" The "apeiron" of Anaximander was without limits, undetermined, principle at the origin or beginning of everything, generating power, active, determining, whole cause, larger than the spatiotemporal limits of the world (or, as others maintained, an infinity of worlds) in process of becoming and perishing. In the "apeiron," the generation and destruction of worlds involves necessarily motion. The "apeiron" has a sort of vitality submitted to eternal motion 24 . Discussing the nature of the universe, Aristotle 25 notes that it follows from his assumptions related to movement that there is "a primary body, something else beyond earth, fire, air and water, [the ancients gave it a name] "aither," derived from the fact that it runs always for an eternity of time." With Aristotle, nature is seen as motion since, as he noted, if we ignore motion we can know nothing about nature.
Aristotle's theory of motion is based on the system of natural places towards which bodies are moving naturally. Gravity, for example, is the tendency of the heavy bodies to reach their natural place, the centre of the world. Universal space constitutes a static system of all these natural places that differ from each other by their distance to the centre of the world. The relativity of motion of perfect bodies results from the equivalence of all points that constitute space where that motion takes place. Space is homogeneous, and since the behaviour does not change from one point to the next, change has to be measured through the change of distance from that body with respect to some other one considered as reference.
The investigations of space, time and motion by the ancients found their culminating achievement in Leibniz and Newton's Calculus that allowed physics to develop as the science that tells us what the world is and how it is so. Rescher writes that the fluidity of the analogue, continuous character of a processual nature is captured by differential equations. This statement raises questions because, in the development of Calculus, we find a sort of reasoning similar to that used in Zeno's Arrow. Actually, any situation requiring differential equations for his description could imply some sort of paradox.
Although differential calculus is still our best tool for analysis, it does not take us close to the real nature of natural objects but in addition, it is contradictory. What is again problematic is precisely the notion of point.
In his study of motion, Galileo had first considered the trajectories of moving bodies as an infinite set of points. Later on, he defined the behaviour, the instantaneous velocity of moving bodies, as varying from one point to the next in a law that relates velocity to time.
One of Newton's 26 achievements is the so-called "geometrization of time" in his Calculus of fluxions, a calculus based on our intuition of motion. His perspective is new, and his method, he claims, is phenomenological, based on observation alone, excluding any a priori. In his famous words, "Absolute space, by its nature and with no relation to anything exterior remains identical to itself and with no motion." Relative space is a dimension or mobile measure of absolute space that our senses determine through its relation to the bodies and that is usually taken for the motionless space.
Time plays a role here, since a state of rest lasts for some time and motion implies a change of place in time. These relative times can be measured in counting events that recur at regular intervals. However, these intervals can only be measured using other intervals, implying a regressio ad infinitum. In order to accommodate these relative times, Newton supposes an absolute time with respect to which events can have some duration independently of the succession of local events: "Absolute time true and mathematical flows uniformly with no relation to anything exterior and is called duration." Relative time, apparent and ordinary, is a sensible and external measure of duration with the help of motion and is usually used in place of true time 27 . In his "De Quadratura," in order to illustrate his analytical method with some typical problem, Newton 28 shows that the difficulties of his position can be reduced to two problems. (i) Given the length of space continuously (i.e. at every [instant of] time), to find the speed of motion at any time, and (ii) given the speed of motion continuously, to find the length of space described at any time proposed. The answer to these questions is Calculus, infinitesimal and integral.
Considering quantities "as though they were generated by continuous increase in the manner of a space which a moving object describes in its course 29 ," Newton applies the infinitesimal calculus to velocity with respect to time: "Mathematical quantities I here consider not as consisting of indivisibles, either parts least possible or infinitely small ones, but as described by a continuous motion. Lines are described as generated through the continuous motion of points; […] time through continuous flux, […] These geneses take place in the physical world and are daily enacted in the motion of the bodies visible before our eyes." Moreover, he found "a method of determining quantities out of the speeds of motion or increment by which they are generated, and naming these speeds of motion or increment 'fluxions' of the quantities generated and the quantities so born 'fluents' […] . Fluxions can be expressed and measured either by the increments of fluent quantities begotten in individual moments of time or by any other quantities whatever proportional to those just barely nascent increments. Fluxions are very closely near as the parts of their fluents begotten in the very smallest equal particles of time."
Nevertheless, Newton remarks that we can have no estimate of time in any other way as measured by some local uniform motion. For that reason, he does not consider time as such but he supposes that some quantity must grow by some uniform fluxion with respect to which any other quantities are measured and that he will then consider it, by analogy, as if it was time. Therefore, it is not necessarily time as such that he considers, but some quantity whose fluxion allows measuring time 30 . Berkeley 31 criticizes Newton's method of fluxions because he introduces the idea of compensation of errors to avoid the contradiction between the errors in the foundation of his method and the fact that it yields correct results. Berkeley talks of the "ghosts of departed quantities." In order to explain the arguments of his method, Newton relies on ultimate ratios of nascent and vanishing finite quantities when they approach their limits. The increments are neither zero nor finite quantities. For him, the last ratio of vanishing quantities must be understood "as the ratio of quantities not before they vanish, nor afterwards, but with which they 29 Idem. 30 Newton, Principia, Book I, Scholium. 31 Berkeley, 1734. vanish." The ultimate magnitudes are not indivisible but diminishable without limit.
From then on, the development of Analysis will give the classical conception of motion its most achieved expression in analytical mechanics where the behaviour of a moving body varies from one point to the next, speed varies and motion is characterized by acceleration.
In classical physics, the position of any object of a system can be determined at each particular time. However, as soon as we rely on statistical mechanics, we only have the probability of some possible states of the system. Still more, with quantum mechanics, we are left with some abstract function that gives us various possible states of a system. If the determinist world of classical mechanics seems still close to the world we can observe, it is no longer the case in the other two systems of description and explanation where theories are less dependent on observation and experience.
It should be stressed that if classical determinism implies that from the knowledge of some state of a system at some moment all states of the system can be predicted, this suppose also a complete precision of the knowledge of that state. However, experience will never provide an absolute degree of precision to the observations 32 . The Newtonian differential conception was supposed to give that complete description of the world. Indeed, the laws of nature were thought of as being universal since the motion of any body at any time and any place in space could be, in principle, uniquely and precisely determined by the analytical methods. Hence, classical physics considers reality as fixed in its properties and if this reality can be determined at some time, it can also be determined at all time. Nevertheless, time and motion, are no longer necessary and are no longer considered in the Calculus. The
At this point, it should be noted that even though our intuition makes us think that the world is continuous, if it is really the case, in no case would this require necessarily the use of differential calculus and reliance on the real numbers. In any case a discrete world and integers would do. It should also be clear that the image of the world that physics and mathematics give us is not unique. One often talks of the picture of the world of physics or mathematics, but almost never raises the question of what we exactly know about the world. We can know very diverse things and in very different ways depending on our a priori choices or preferences. Some may choose a discrete view, for example, and rebuild the world with cellular automata, offering A New Kind of Science, to mention Wolfram's latest book.
arguments based on time and motion that Newton used to found his Calculus do not necessarily apply to questions concerning them anymore.
This is precisely what Whitehead reproached to Newton: his description of matter by abstracting it from time, considering matter "at an instant" and preventing then any idea of process. "If process be fundamental, such abstraction is erroneous" 33 .
One could say that with Newton's theory of fluxions a breaking point is reached. If a process is analyzed, then either, as Rescher seems to imply, Calculus is the tool to analyse it, or, as Whitehead claims, it is there that Newton missed the point (so to speak!).
W. R. Hamilton's 34 proposal to found algebra on the pure intuition of time is an attempt to reintroduce time in mathematics. Not time as an analogy used to illustrate the rules of algebra, but time as coextensive to algebra. For Hamilton, pure time is the pure Kantian form of intuition, not the apparent time of the objects perceived or the external chronology of the temporal order of events. As such, pure time can serve as foundation of mathematics. It is because they are objects of thought, i.e. intuitioned by a mental act, and because they exist in the mind, that the moments of time exist. That minimal objective existence is necessary if one wants to build numbers from moments of time.
In order to serve as basis for the construction of mathematical objects, time must be separated from the objective order of appearances. Moments of time must be objects of thought. Thereby, time remains objective but it is in no way determined by the objective order of events.
Having explained the process by which mathematical objects (numbers) that have no necessary spatio-temporal existence can be constructed on this intuition of time, Hamilton continues to remark that our knowledge of time seems to contain more than pure order only, or progression, because time can refer to events that happen or have happened, orders beyond control of our will, while algebra is based on the purely mental idea of order which can be changed arbitrarily. In algebra and arithmetic, the mind creates its own order and progressions at will. Mathematical time is thus a creation more subjective than the time of perception. Science involves observation, reasoning and interpretation. But Hamilton also remarked that science refers not only to appearances and to thoughts, but also to believed realities, to existences outside ourselves, existences whose evidence escapes logical or mathematical proof and which are dynamical powers 35 . In spite of the Romantic influence of Kant and Coleridge and although they were not systematically elaborated, Hamilton's philosophical thoughts deserve some attention in the context of process philosophy.
Epistemology and Physics
Rescher notes that although Aristotle considered knowledge as part of a praxis, in the tradition, it has often been seen as substantial, a collection of things, the facts. Nevertheless, knowledge comes from some inquiring process, not from the collection of ready-made facts. Rescher thus proposes that the appropriate theory of knowledge, rather than a representational or a constructive one, is the causal-commerce theory, which sees true thought and its object as two phases of a process of mutual interconnection where the external order of nature and the internal order of mind-body are aligned.
We can find some illustration of these ideas of Rescher in the context of early 20th century British natural philosophy (Whitehead, Milne, Whitrow, and other philosophers scientists). One author, M. Johnson
36
, proposes non-classical definitions of scientific knowledge and ways to test its truthfulness. Relying on E. A. Milne's Kinematic Relativity
37
, he insists that scientific knowledge is not a "thing" but a formal structure, a tendency of reasoning upon formal relationships rather than on some correspondence with any imagined external world. Truth is not a property of knowledge possessed by some scientist but depends on the process of communicating results; it consists in chains of arguments linked by communicability.
According to Milne, the notion of physical space has no meaning and any attempt to describe in terms of phenomena what is described by mathematics always reaches "fantastic and extravagant conclusions." An example is general relativity that has endowed space with physical properties. In his approach, time and space are very different elements. Time is basic; space is in some way a construction. 35 Hamilton quoted by Graves, in Hankins, 1980, pp. 289-290. 36 Johnson, 1946 . 37 Milne, E. A., Relativity, Gravitation and World Structure, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935.
Milne's notion of event relies explicitly on that of Whitehead and his rationalist approach relies on Descartes. In his theory, he tries to develop a basis to describe natural phenomena and to account for their governing laws, making no hypotheses about the coincidence of these laws with the empirical laws of nature. His physics is purely a priori, axiomatic and deductive and intends to explain phenomena in deriving their laws by deductive logical processes. The world can be soundly described before any sort of experience, on the sole basis of mathematics. Science is possible without specific appeal to empirical laws if, at each stage, we say exactly what we mean and state the precise means by which we become aware of what we are trying to communicate. This is Milne's definition of the "branch of metaphysics we call epistemology 38 ." More precisely, science is possible without appeal to contingent laws provided its quantitative statements are precisely explained in terms of operations carried out and communicated to other observers who can then duplicate the same observations.
In his view, the essence of relativity is as follows: one observer from his own description of a phenomenon can predict quantitatively an independent observer's description of the same phenomenon. We can say that the universe is rational, and thus intelligible, because we may infer all relations that exist between the quantitative aspects of a phenomenon as soon as we are aware of these aspects. Appeal to experience happens only when an observer identifies his symbols with nature, having "weaved strands of possibility into a texture," teleologically guided in his work by the prospect of reaching something of interest, suitable for comparison with nature 39 . 38 Milne, 1943. 39 The theory starts with some idealized observer who can experience the flow of events in his consciousness. This 'ego' is a perceiving being whose sensations, the events in his consciousness, can arrange themselves in a single linear order, a directed time-order. Correlating this order with the real numbers, he defines a clock.
This ego can also perceive and send light signals to which he assigns two numbers, t1, the time of sending a signal, and t2, that of the light returning to him. Out of these, he can construct two other numbers and call them coordinates. The first (t = ½ (t 1 +t 2 )) defines the epoch of the events and the second (r = ½ c(t2-t1)), where c is the space of light, the distance defined by time coordinates.
Next, a distant monad, a second observer, who can perform the same operations, emits and receives light and builds a clock. Both observers now send their own J. Whithrow 40 has attempted to give a metaphysical foundation to Natural Philosophy based on Milne's Kinematic Relativity that he considers as the most achieved such system. He notes that although scientists in general reject a rationalist approach that tries to show the metaphysical necessity of natural laws, scientific method is dominated by two principles: the principle of uniformity and the principle of communicability. In addition, these principles are sufficient to define an a priori framework for physics on a deductive basis.
It is on this second principle and on Milne's operational method that M. Johnson relies to build a theory of knowledge in which scientific knowledge is defined by its communicability and its truth is tested by a coherence theory of truth. The individuals are individual observers who, contrary to Leibniz's monads that do not communicate, entertain mutual relationships as in Milne's theory.
Johnson claims that his methodology derives from that of the realist philosophers Russell and Broad who see physics as the study of form and structure rather than that of things, and whose central problem was the gap between the sense-data and what the mind makes of them, an interaction that Rescher sees as the pivotal mode of process.
Johnson also agrees with Whitehead to recognize the problem of the subjective mind with respect to the objective reality and to criticize the misleading transfer of argumentation from physics to metaphysics, space and time being fallaciously treated as substance. Whitehead also showed that minds abstract the concepts of space, time and point-instants from the events described in the relativistic space-time continuum. Space-time is not an abstraction from our actual experience of motion or from some temporal order. Matter is also a derived abstraction, not a simple object of reading of time at their clock to each other, i.e. they make three observations each. Then they can regraduate and correlate their clocks in such a way that they agree one with the other and that all their observations coincide. Doing so, they define a 'congruence'. Two observers with congruent clocks are then equivalent. Generalizing to any number of observers, Milne defines a 'substratum', according to him, one of the fundamental concepts of natural philosophy, from which the laws of dynamics, optics and gravitation can be deduced. An interesting feature of the theory to note is the existence of two scales of time. In one scale, the universe is at rest; in the other, it is dynamical. The passage from one to the other simply results from a simple logarithmic transformation of the equations. perception nor an ultimate concept for science and philosophy of science. Time as a "thing" is a myth to be replaced by "temporal order" or "experience of events as sequences 41 ." According to Johnson, physics, relativistic and quantic, has shown that the classical way of building theories from hypothesis to laws of nature based on causality and mechanism was inadequate, but also, that the formal deductive mathematics and empirical inductive natural sciences were inadequate to convey the meaning of truthful argument. While traditional investigations started from physical propositions as premises of deductions, Milne starts from epistemological premises which, according to Johnson's view, amount to some notion of knowledge, the "physical" being redefined as "intelligible" or "knowable." This notion of intelligibility is of course related to the operational procedure of Milne's theory that starts from individual perception that orders events into time sequences. Knowledge, which amounts to showing that these time sequences can be connected, is true if it is coherent and communicable.
Logic has known the same fate as physics, passing from the belief in the eternal truth of propositions to the emphasis on propositional functions enabling logical forms to be meaningful independently of any particular proposition. By analogy, the static properties true or false are replaced by "always true," "sometimes false," "formally correct but materially correct only if…." Contrary to the tradition that defines truth either, by self-consistency and internal coherence of some set of ideas, or by the correspondence of those ideas with independent facts, Johnson defines truth as coherence between propositions. Coherent statements do "correspond" to one another in the way the realists' statements correspond to the facts.
What imposed Johnson to consider truth as communicability is a fundamental ambiguity: coherence as a test of communicability of scientific truth and coherence between "ideas" is scientifically but not metaphysically identical with coherence of "propositions and relations 41 Two examples of Johnson's statements show how close to that of N. Rescher his position is. "Static configurations of 'things' are seldom of importance to physics and one more vital interest is their tendencies to alter and the differential equations show what controls that alteration; the precise character of the 'flux' of any property tells more of its nature than any 'still picture'. This is one of the reasons why 'Time' is the most essential of physical variables […]" (pp. 58-59) and "'Intelligibility' has thus become divorced from fictitious claims to 'know what thing underlies phenomena' in any sense of deriving a causal model of mechanism and expecting it to be a picture reduced in size from perceptual experience". (p. 60).
expressible as equations." This notion of coherence extracted from physics avoids the problem of the infinite regression to which that of correspondence is confronted. Indeed, "by what independent comparison can we check the supposed reality with which our statements must correspond?" As soon as we abandon the claim to know all about the unknowable "thing", we have to adopt the coherence theory of truth 42 .
Conclusion: Unavoidable Subjectivity
The growing interest for process thought in philosophy reveals a changing perspective and attitude towards philosophy and science, towards the knowledge and the image of the world they offer. The developments of history and philosophy of science over the last century clearly show that evolution. Increasingly, besides the results of their investigations, the scientists' activities are taken into account. The process of inquiry comes first. In some way, science can be seen as 'scientists at work', an activity performed in a specific cultural framework. Process thought must thus account for some objective knowledge of the world while acknowledging that a subjective mind builds that knowledge. Our current scientific knowledge is not necessarily as objective as usually thought or taught. Process thought has to take into account statements of the sciences that are revisable and that will eventually be revised. Newtonian physics has been largely superseded by relativistic and quantum physics that will probably be superseded by different theorizations.
A principle of linguistic relativity, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 43 , claims that language determines what we call reality. Various linguistic communities live in various worlds. Our conception of the universe is entirely determined by language and to various languages correspond various models of the universe. What we call science and philosophy are products of the Indo-European languages and of their particular ontologies.
If process thought takes subjectivity and cultural relativity into account, it has to define its proper notion of objective knowledge. Comparing the world given by our perceptions to the world as it is said to be, we have to consider our knowledge of the world and the way it is acquired. Following Rescher (CI16, 17, 24) , we have to recognize a role to the mind in the construction of the world. The world, as we conceive it, is such as to be construed in terms whose adequate explication calls for a reference to minds and their capacities. Rescher has often emphasized that theories and models are constructions dependent on the researcher intellectual and cultural background. Nevertheless, although they are products of his mind in the first place, the theories and models are necessary for our understanding of the world and in any case, they rest essentially on an empirical view of how things work in the world 44 . If we want to support some form of subjectivity, we can hope to gain some new insights into the nature of knowledge and how it is acquired from the rapid developments of cognitive sciences. These developments could add support to the view that the world is only as we conceive it to be, that all information on the world is obtained through operations of the mind that builds models through which we conceive that world. Connectionism in philosophy of mind could show how we understand theories and explanations in modelling the cognitive activities 45 . In such an approach, inquiry no longer operates at the level of truth-value or confirmation of theoretical or empirical statements first, but at a higher, holistic level of global picture or design that is to be reconstructed. In this perspective, scientific explanation could well be radically different. However, this is prospective speculation and here, Rescher does not take us that far. Nevertheless, process philosophy implies a new and different attitude towards the world, science and traditional philosophy. The detour through the semantics of natural language and through chapters of the history of mathematics and physics in order to illustrate and better understand Rescher's views was also intended to underline some problems and limitations of our classical ways of representing the world and to suggest various orientations towards possible solutions through older and forgotten proposals. 44 See PrP. 45 Churchland, P. M., A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1989. If we agree on rehabilitating subjectivity and intersubjectivity and on recognizing our cultural determinations in the construction of our conceptions of a dynamic world, new notions of objectivity, models and theories may have to be defined.
